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TITLE EXAMINATIONS IN MICHIGAN AS AFFECTED BY
THE GENERAL FEDERAL TAX LIEN
L. Hart Wright*

T

are three federal tax liens which serve to haunt the average
title examiner. The first of these is pitched at the wholesale level;
it is a shotgun type lien applicable to all federal taxes and is now provided for by section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code. The second
and third are not nearly so sweeping. One is confined to the federal
estate tax, being provided for by section 827 of the code, while the other
reinforces the federal gift tax and is the product of section I 009 of the
code.
The discussion which follows deals only with the first, the most
general, of the three liens, and then only insofar as it affects the examination of titles in Michigan. The present inquiry is circumscribed by
this geographical limitation only because Michigan stands almost alone
in failing to come to an agreement with the federal authorities as to
the requirements which should be satisfied before such a lien will be
valid as against good faith purchasers. Accordingly, title examiners of
this state who encounter this lien face problems which are not shared
by practitioners in other states.
The general lien established by section 3670 of the code is a "catchall" in more than one sense. The magnitude of its function, i. e., to be
"on call" with respect to all federal taxes, is matched by the equally
broad dispersion of its impact, for it attaches, according to the language
of the statute, to "all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to" the person "liable to pay any tax."1
HERE

REcoRDING AND PruoRITms PROBLEM

A. Early Federal Legislation
The original establishment of this general federal tax lien was not
accompanied by a requirement that it be filed or recorded. 2 Since historically the common law rule of caveat emptor preceded statutory
recording systems, one should not be surprised that the absence here
of a specific provision protecting third parties led the United States
,,. Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.

I.R.C., §3670.
2Act of July 13, 1866, c. 184, §9, 14 Stat. L. 107. A revision appeared in Rev. Stat.,
§3186 (1875). With additional revisions, the lien provisions now appear in 26 U.S.C.A.
§3670 et seq.
1
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Supreme Court to conclude back in 1893 that the government's lien
was good even as against a good faith purchaser of the tax-lienor's
property. 3 This conclusion, obviously disturbing to the title examiner,
was followed by a long period during which repeated proposals were
made for modification of the law. 4 Finally, in 1913, these constructive
suggestions bore fruit; relief legislation for the benefit of third parties
was enacted.5 From the standpoint of the Michigan lawyer, the character of that relief has now gone through two distinct major stages.

B. The First Stage of Federal Relief Legislation, and the
Effect of State Legislation re Filing of Federal Tax Liens

The first stage of federal relief legislation terminated just before the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942. By the end of this first stage
Congress had provided that the lien in question would not be valid "as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor until
notice thereof has been filed by the collector" in one of two ways. 6 It
was first to be filed "in accordance with the law of the State or Territory in which the property was situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law provided for the filing of such liens." 7 Where, however, such filing had not been provided for by local law, the lien was
to be filed "in the office of the clerk of the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the property subject to the lien is
situated."8
Forty-seven state legislatures have now responded to this invitation
to enact complementary or enabling legislation. 9 The type of provision
cast in the most general terms is illustrated by that of Minnesota.10
3 United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 13 S.Ct. 846. And yet, 57 years later a
circuit court in Wayne County, Michigan was so bold as to conclude that enforcement of
this lien would violate the due process clause of the federal constitution if the provision
governing the filing of a notice thereof did not call for a precise description of the land
against which the lien was claimed. Hicks v. Carpenter, 50-1 U.S.T.C. ,r9150 (1950).
4 See the American Bar Association's proposals cited in Clark, "Federal Tax Liens and
Their Enforcement," 33 VA. L. REv. 13 at 23 (1947).
5Act of March 4, 1913, c. 166, 37 Stat. L. 1016. As subsequently revised, this act
now appears in 26 U.S.C.A. §3670 et seq. In United States v. Maniaci, (D.C. Mich.
1939) 36 F. Supp. 293, affd., (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 935, the district court attributed this change in the law to the decision of United States v. Curry, (D.C. Md. 1912)
201 F. 371.
6 I.R.C., §3672 as last amended by Revenue Act of 1939, §401.
7 Ibid.
s Ibid.
9 New Hampshire is the only state without such legislation.
10 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §272.48.
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That state, along with five others,1 1 provided a simple authorization,
without more, for the filing of such notices in the office of the register
of deeds of the appropriate county. Of the remaining forty-one states,
all but two have enacted the Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration
Act1 2 or have passed statutes which substantially correspond to that
act.13 While the acts of these states are more explicit than are those of
the group represented by Minnesota, they still, nevertheless, permit the
collector to file a notice which descriptively contains nothing more than
the name of the taxpayer, his address, and the amount of taxes owing.
Originally, Michigan, one of the two states whose legislation has not
yet been described, was also content with this.14 But the legislative
session of 1925 proved to be more demanding. It added to the necessary authorization a special condition requiring the notice to include a
precise description of any land against which a lien was to be asserted.15
Only one other state has followed Michigan's lead in this regard.16
This added condition was not well received by the office of the
Collector of Internal Revenue stationed in Michigan. The dissatisfac11 Iowa Stat. Ann. (1949) §335.11; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §35-2010; R.I. Gen.
Laws (1938) c. 451, §l; Mass. Ann. Laws (1944) c. 36, §24; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 79,
§255.
12Afaska Comp. Laws (1949) §48-9-1 et seq.; Ark. Stat. (1947) §51-101 et seq.; Del.
Rev. Code (1935) §3355 et seq.; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) §12790 et seq.; Idaho Code
(1947) §45-201 et seq.; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-3221 et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1948) §382.480 et seq.; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §52:51 et seq.; Md. Code (1939) art. 17,
§10 et seq.; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §84-3901 et seq.; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) §2123
et seq.; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §63-101 et seq.; 32 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940)
§240 et seq.; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §67-1801 et seq.; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936)
tit. 74, §141 et seq.; S.C. Code (1942) §2576; S.D. Code (1939) §39.1601 et seq.; Tenn.
Code (Williams, 1934) §8029 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §52-6-1 et seq.; Wis. Stat.
(1949) §74.76; and Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §55-601 et seq.
13 (a) States with laws which are practically identical to the uniform act but which
laws are not recognized by the Commissioners: Calif. Gov. Code (Deering, 1943) §27330
et seq.; Ga. Code Ann. (1937) §67-2601; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §893 et seq.; Mo.
Rev. Stat. (1949) §14.010 et seq.; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §44-65 et seq.; Ohio Code
Ann. (Throckmorton, 1948) §2757-1; Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. (1933) §11337-1 et seq.
(b) Statutes basically the same as the uniform act but set forth in somewhat different
form and language: Fla. Stat. (1949) §28.20; ill. Ann. Stat. (1934) c. 82, §66 et seq.;
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §23-1522 et seq.; Vt. Rev. Stat. (1947) §2787 et seq.; and W.Va.
Code (1949) §3916.
(c) Statutes the language of which is unrelated to uniform act but where the effect
is much the same: Ariz. Code (1939) §17-807; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §46:16-13; Tex.
Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6644; Va. Code (1950) §55-139.
(d) Statutes less detailed than uniform act but more explicit than was that of Minnesota: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 33, §9 et seq.; Col. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 101, §62; Kan. Gen.
Stat. (1949) §79-2065 et seq.; and Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 68, §371 et seq.
14 Pub. Act No. 104, May 2, 1923.
1r; Pub. Act 13, Mar. 24, 1925, now found in Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §7.751.
16 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7213.
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tion manifested by that office is easily understood, however, when it is
realized that literally the Michigan statute prevented that office from
adhering to the more convenient practice which the Treasury was entitled to follow, and did follow, in practically every other state-namely,
the practice of filing with appropriate county offices blanket notices
which asserted a lien against all of the real and personal property of a
taxpayer, no descriptions of particular property being included. In any
event, the local collector was not quick to abandon this latter more convenient practice. In the case, for example, of one Michigan taxpayer,
Thomas Maniaci, the collector disregarded the local statutory condition
by filing with the Register of Deeds of Kent County one of the so-called
blanket notices. Perhaps as a measure of insurance, the collector also
filed a blanket notice with the clerk of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan. Thereafter Maniaci sold certain
real estate to a purchaser who lacked actual notice of the asserted tax
lien. There remained, of course, the question of constructive notice,
and this came first before a federal district court sitting in Michigan
when the government sought to take advantage of its alleged lien by
foreclo~ing on the property now held by the purchaser.
The district court in question held against the government and for
the purchaser.17 Certain language in the then existing federal statute
was seized upon to justify the following conclusions:
(I) That Congress had not intended to test its constitutional
power to force states to accept for filing notices which did not
comply with local law;
(2) That Congress had intended that the collector would confine himself to the types of notice which satisfied local requirements-so long, at least, as those requirements were reasonable;
and
(3) That the requirement of the Michigan statute, to the
effect that notices of federal tax liens, to be filed, must include a
description of any land against which a lien was to be asserted, was
sufficiently in keeping with our modern traditions with respect to
real estate to meet this test of reasonableness.
The court was persuaded to these conclusions because the then
existing federal statute did indeed provide that the collector, in order
to preserve his lien against third parties, must have filed the notice "in
accordance with" local law whenever the local jurisdiction had "provided for the filing of such liens."18
17 United States v. Maniaci, (D.C. Mich. 1939) 36 F. Supp. 293.
18 I.R.C., §3672, as last amended by Revenue Act of 1939, §401.
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The ruling, to the effect that the £.ling in the county office was
ineffective, was supplemented, by implication, with the conclusion that
the £.ling of the second or duplicate blanket notice against Maniaciin the office of the clerk of the federal district court-was also ineffective, apparently for the very good reason that such a £.ling was authorized by the federal statute only when the jurisdiction in which the
property was located had failed to provide a proper means for £ling in
county offices-and, as before noted, Michigan had, according to the
court's findings, established a suitable means.
With reference then to the first stage of federal relief legislation,
the Maniaci decision, a case subsequently affirmed per curiam by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,19 was authority for two propositions: that blanket notices of federal ta.x liens did not validate such
liens as against third parties with respect to land in Michigan though
£.led (I) in a county office, or (2) with a federal district court clerk.
And these conclusions rested in final analysis on the cumulative .effect
of the language of the then existing federal statute and of the Michigan
statute.
C. The Second and Last Stage of Relief; Recent Federal Legislation
At least one of the two foregoing propositions has been placed in
jeopardy by events which followed the Maniaci decision. In 1942, two
years after that decision, the Treasury Department induced Congress
to delete from section 3672 the specific statutory language upon which
the court had relied in reaching the two conclusions previously noted. 20
The purpose intended to be served by this amendment was explained by the House Ways and Means Committee in the following
language:
"This section of the bill clarifies section 3672(a) of the code
by providing expressly that the notice required to validate a lien
for Federal tax against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or
judgment creditor shall be sufficient if £.led in the office in which
the £.ling of such notice is authorized by the law of the State or
Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated,
10 (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 935 Accord, United States v. Detroit, (6th Cir. 1943)
138 F. (2d) 418.
20 Revenue Act of 1942, §505. The language, to the effect that the lien should not
be valid as against third parties until notice thereof was filed "(l) In accordance with the
law of the State or Territory •••," was changed to read that the lien would not be valid
against third parties until notice thereof was filed "(I) In the office in which the filing
of such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory••••"
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without regard to the other general requirements with respect to
recording prescribed by the law of such State or Territory."21
The Senate Finance Committee in emphasizing that the new bill
authorized "the State or Territory only to designate the local office for
the filing," 22 added that this was "in accordance with the long continued pr~ctice of the Treasury Department, which has been questioned
in the courts. " 23

The collector stationed in Michigan responded to this amendment
by attempting to file a blanket notice against one taxpayer with the
Register of Deeds of Wayne County. The offering, however, was
refused, and a suit for mandamus followed. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Youngblood v. United States, 24 affirmed the lower
court's decision in denying the petition for the writ. Two distinct
grounds were expressly asserted for the holding. The court once again
expressed the now doubtful view that Congress had not intended to test
its constitutional power to force a state to accept for filing notices which
did not comply with the niceties of local law. 25 The appellate court
asserted further that the district court in which the petition for mandamus had originally been filed did not in any event have jurisdiction
to grant such writs in the type of case under consideration.
Any doubt one might have with respect to the first of these determinations should be multiplied manyfold with respect to a further suggestion by the court in the nature of dictum relative to the question of
whether the collector in Michigan could now file a blanket notice with
the clerks of the local federal district courts in order to validate liens
against third parties. It is true that the amendment by Congress in
1942 did not disturb the verbal statement of the rule to the effect that
a notice filed with a federal district court clerk was effective only when
"the State or Territory has not by law authorized the filing of such
notice in an office within the State or territory." 26 But this fact did not
justify the implication contained in the decision to the effect that a
state had gone far enough, i. e., had fully satisfied the amended section
3672 and the statutory rights of the collector, if the conditions which the
local statute prescribed with reference to the contents of the notice were
21H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 173 (1942).
22 S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 248 (1942).
23 Ibid.
24 (6th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 912.
25 Id. at 914. The court stated: ''The amendment contained

in the Revenue Act of
1942 evidences no change of attitude on the part of Congress in its recognition of the
right of a state to regulate the filing of federal tax lien notices."
·
26 I.R.C., §3672.
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reasonable. 27 The validity of this dictum depends, of course, upon the
proper meaning to be attributed now to the previously quoted statutory
words, "such notice." The pre-enactment materials quoted above, particularly the extract from the report of the House Committee, certainly
suggest that Congress intended to render legally sufficient for the purposes of section 3672 the so-called blanket notice,28 and there was
nothing whatever to suggest that collectors should confine themselves
to notices of a more demanding quality simply because prescribed by
local law.
Title examiners must then ask of themselves: what result would
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reach today in a foreclosure
action brought by the government against a good faith purchaser of
Michigan land to enforce a lien a blanket notice of which had been
filed with the appropriate local federal district court clerk? Would it
disregard the seemingly erroneous implication of the Youngblood case
and hold for the government by relying on what seems to have been
the underlying purpose for the change in 1942, i. e., on the meaning
which the relevant congressional committees attached to the word "notice"? The prospect of an a$.rmative resolution of this question is very
real for two reasons. First, any other holding would he tantamount to
a declaration that no purpose whatever was intended or served by the
amendment in 1942 of the federal act-a fairly ridiculous supposition
to say the least. Second, the implication of the Youngblood decision
to which objection is made here can be ignored without disturbing the
result which it reached. In other words, there is a real difference
between saying:
27 The court stated: "Upon obvious principles of comity, the Congress of the United
States has provided for compliance by the Government with state recording laws. The
notice of tax lien involved in this controversy does not so comply." (6th Cir. 1944) 141 F.
(2d) 912 at 915.
Because it was a matter of foreign law, the question of whether the Michigan act
complemented the federal act was treated by both parties in the Youngblood case as a
question of fact, the government's affirmative assertion being admitted by the defendant.
The government was careful, however, to note that if the state would not permit the
filing of notices which were legally sufficient under federal law, then the collector was
authorized to validate the lien by filing such legally sufficient notices with the clerk of the
federal district court. See Appellee's Brief, Case No. 9594, p. 8.
28 The test of legal sufficiency with respect to federal tax liens is, of course, a matter
to be established by federal law. Congress could even validate the lien against good faith
purchasers without any notice whatever. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 13 S.Ct.
846 (1893).
It must also be understood that the legal conclusion, to the effect that Congress did
not intend as a matter of power to force local state officials to accept such notices for filing
if the latter would thereby violate their trust, has no bearing on the question of whether
a given state act fully complements the federal acts.
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( 1) That Congress did not intend to force state officers to
accept £lings which violated their duty under state law; and saying
(2) That Congress intended to restrain a federal official, the
collector, from validating a lien by £ling blanket notices with the
clerk of the federal district court in the instance where the state
evidenced objections to that type of notice.
By way of summary, then, while a local register of deeds cannot
lawfully £le blanket notices, it is the writer's judgment that the future
may hold in store a decision to the effect that the collector in Michigan
has been entitled since 1942 to validate liens against third parties by
filing blanket notices with the clerk of the appropriate federal district
court in Michigan. Certainly this prospect is sufficiently great to require
cautious title examiners to assume that such will be the case.

D. Priorities Problem as Affected by Actual Practices of
Related Agencies

This background of statutory and case law does not, of course, solve
the title examiner's problem as affected by the general federal tax lien.
Account must also be taken of the actual present practices of the three
agencies the actions of which contribute, directly and indirectly, to the
shape of the abstract which he is called upon to examine. What, then,
in this connection, has been the impact of these statutory and case
developments upon the practices of the collector, upon the practices of
the various registers of deeds, and £nally upon the practices of the
abstract companies?
In spite of the developments just described, the collector in Detroit
continues to offer for filing in the various counties notices asserting
blanket liens upon all of a taxpayer's real and personal property-no
descriptions of particular property being included.29 As a matter of
insurance, however, the collector has in some cases included descriptions of particular realty, and, more important, has in every case filed
a duplicate notice with the clerk of the appropriate federal district
court. 30
29 There are probably several reasons why the collector continues this practice: (1)
public relations, i.e., to give as much notice as is conveniently possible; (2) the possibility
that actual notice obtained through examination of abstracts would be held sufficient; (3)
the possibility that constructive notice would as a matter of federal law be achieved when
a register of deeds accepts the filing-even though the acceptance is contrary to local law;
and ( 4) the even more ,remote possibility that the Youngblood case may at some future
date be overruled.
30 This information was supplied orally to the author by the General Counsel's office
of the Collector stationed in Michigan.
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The various county registers of deeds have responded in different
ways to the collector's attempt to £le notices asserting blanket liens.
In Washtenaw County, for example, such notices are accepted and
filed without reservation. Wayne County, on the other hand, refused
for a few years after 1943 to accept such notices for filing. In more
recent years, however, such notices have been accepted, but all are
stamped "personal property only," before being actually filed.
The abstract companies also follow divergent practices. One company with which the writer is familiar is located in a county where the
register of deeds files without reservation all blanket notices offered by
the government. The company in question checks the files, in the
county offices only, against the name of the last record owner of the
property, and reflects the lien in the abstract where the name is common
to both the abstract and the files. Another company, one located in
Detroit, takes the position that such notices in county offices, being
ineffective, should not be reflected in the abstract. I am informed,
however, that other companies in that same area reflect the filings even
though the register of deeds has stamped the notices "personal property only." In fully assessing the contribution of the abstract companies
to the title examiner's problems, one must couple with these divergent
practices as to the liens filed in county offices the fact that most abstract
companies expressly state in the certificates which accompany their
abstracts that only matters of record in county offices have been covered,
and that no check has been made of those matters on file with the
clerks of the federal district courts.31

E. Conclusions re Proper Functions of Related Agencies
The foregoing matters, namely, the statutes, the case law, and the
practices of the three agencies which contribute to the content of an
abstract, lead the author at least to the following three conclusions with
reference to the proper practices which should be followed by the three
agencies.
(1) A register of deeds should not, as a purely legal proposition, accept for filing a blanket notice asserting a federal lien on all
of a taxpayer's real property where such property is not described
3l The Michigan Title Association's Uniform Certificate includes the following: ''This
certificate does not include any matters filed in the United States District Court; or matters
filed in the office of the County Clerk, Circuit or Probate Courts, where no notice
of the same appears in any instrument in the chain of title recorded or filed in the office
of the Register of Deeds. Matters referred to in this paragraph will be abstracted and
certified to by special request only.''
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in the notice. Such offerings, wholly apart from the question of
whether federal notices are also deficient when not acknowledged
and signed by two witnesses,32 do not satisfy the conditions prerequisite for filing in Michigan. Nevertheless, we shall find as a
practical matter that the county officers will actually be contributing to the security of land titles in Michigan if they do continue
to accept such notices for filing.
(2) The author fully understands the plight of those abstract
companies which feel that their product should reflect everything
the register of deeds permits to be filed, including the blanket
liens under discussion, for, after all, such companies are not engaged in the practice of law, and perhaps should not, therefore,
decide for their customers the question of whether or not a particular filed instrument constitutes true constructive notice. In
any event, we shall also find that abstract companies will also be
contributing to the security of land titles in Michigan if they will
continue to reflect such filed notices.
(3) Unlike the county officers, the clerks of the federal district
courts in Michigan should as a matter of law-and do-accept for
filing blanket notices of liens offered by the collector, for such
filings will very likely serve to validate the lien inasmuch as Michigan does not now have proper enabling legislation, i. e., legislation which permits the filing in county offices of instruments which
are legally sufficient under federal law.

F. Conclusion re Title Examiner's Problem
In the end, the lawyer, with respect to the lien provided for by
section 3670, is likely to be confronted with any one of three typical
problems. The first of these involves the situation where the abstract reB.ects a notice on file in a county office which notice asserts a lien
against, and carries an accurate description of, the particular property
covered by the abstract. The second concerns the reflection in the
abstract of a blanket notice which is on file in the county office and
which asserted a lien against all the real and personal property of a
person at the time he was listed in the chain of title. The last involves
the fear of the lawyer that there may be other blanket liens which have
not, for one or more reasons, been reflected in the abstract.
1. Notices which include a description of the property against
which a lien is asserted. How should the title examiner react to the first

of these three problems, namely, to the situation where the abstract
32

See discussion infra, at p. 193.
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reflects that there is on file in the county office a notice of a lien which
carries an accurate description of the property covered by the abstract?
It is not wholly clear that even this notice was entitled to be filed
in the county office. The offerings of the collector to a county register's
office have not usually been witnessed in the manner required by the
Michigan statutes with reference at least to all other recorded instruments affecting real estate. While the Attorney General of Michigan
ruled in November 1951 that the federal offerings were not subject to
this requirement,33 it should be noted, nevertheless, that the matter has
not been settled by court decision. In any event, there are two good
reasons why the attorney who examines that abstract should note in
his opinion the fact that a tax lien exists on the property. The first of
these reasons involves the question of whether the reflection in the
abstract of such a filing is, when seen by the attorney in the course of
title examination, sufficient under federal law with reference to actual
notice to put his client as a reasonable man on inquiry.34 The absence
of a definitive answer from the federal courts with reference to this
question would perhaps, without more, lead the title examiner to note
an exception in his written opinion.35 But there is an even more persuasive reason for such action; he can be sure, in view of the collector's
practice to make duplicate filings, that a like notice is on file with the
clerk of the federal district court, and this notice would, according to
the view previously expressed herein, serve to validate the lien under
the amended federal act if the notice in the county office were ineffective. In this connection, two matters to be discussed later are presently
assumed, namely, that the lien has not expired through lapse of time
and that the interest of the taxpayer was actually of the type which
could be reached by such a lien.

2. Blanket notices actually re~ected in an abstract. It will be recalled that the second situation which may confront the title examiner
33 Atty. Gen. Op. No. 1482, Nov. 1, 1951. Certain parts of the opinion are misleading, for reference is made exclusively to the pre-1942 language of the federal act. However, this does not affect, one way or the other, the arguments set forth there with respect
to the question under consideration.
34 It is also conceivable, though not probable, that acceptance by the local register of
deeds, though contrary to law, would result in validating the lien, for the matter turns
ultimately on federal law. That this conclusion is not likely to be reached stems from the
fact that the Youngblood decision held that Congress did not intend to force a register of
deeds to violate local law. It is unlikely then that the same court would hold Congress
intended to take advantage of a breach of the local officer's duty.
35 Some courts do hold that a defective filing cannot even be the basis for actual notice.
See e.g., Nordman v. Rau, 86 Kan. 19, 119 P. 351 (1911). Contra, Prince v. Alford, 173
Ark. 633, 293 S.W. 36 (1927); Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 166 Cal. 426, 137 P.
21 (1913).
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involves the case where the abstract reflects a notice on £le in a county
office which notice asserted a lien against all of the real and personal
property of a person at the time he was listed in the chain of title.
While the filing in the county office in this instance was clearly illegal,
the title examiner should, nevertheless, applaud the disclosure. For
again, in addition to the possibility of actual notice arising out of this
disclosure, he can be sure that a like notice is on file with the clerk of
the appropriate federal district court, and this notice is, as previously
stated, probably effective to validate the lien. The reflection then in the
abstract of a filing which did not validate the lien (filing in the county)
is an indirect means whereby the title examiner can learn of a different
£.ling which did serve to validate the lien. That indirect means fills a
vacuum, for none of the blanket federal liens which have been placed
on file in Michigan with clerks of the federal district courts would,
absent a duplicate but illegal filing in the county register's office, be
picked up by abstract companies in the normal course of compiling an
abstract. Indeed, as before noted, most abstract companies state in the
certificate which accompanies the abstract that the latter is limited to
matters on file or on record in county offices.
Before moving on to the third type of problem which may confront
the title examiner, note should be made of the problem occasioned by
the prevalence, particularly in the more populous counties, of common
names. It is quite possible, for example, that the name of the vendor
of the particular land in question may be the same as is one of the
names on file in the book of liens kept by the register of deeds' office.
That vendor, however, on being informed of the consequent exception
in the title examiner's opinion, may, in a petition for a certificate of mistaken identity filed with the collector, prove to the latter that he, the
vendor-whose name we will assume is John Brown-is not actually
the same John Brown against whom the federal lien was filed. Acertificate of mistaken identity will then be furnished by the collector and
the transac;tion.can be put through without 'further ado.
3. Blanket notices which may not be re~ected in an abstract. The
third type of problem to which attention should be directed concerns
those blanket notices under section 3672 which serve to validate the
lien but which may not have been reflected, for one or m9re reasons,
in a given abstract. There are a number of situations in which this
may occur; but it should be sufficient here to enumerate the four illus-
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trative cases which are deemed most likely to recur with some frequency.
(a) Notices of blanket federal liens which were offered to the
Register of Deeds of Wayne County in the period immediately
following 1943, and to like offices in one or two other counties
which followed the same practice, were not accepted for filing.
But notices of these same liens were accepted, and properly so, by
the appropriate federal clerk. Since the abstract will not cover
matters on file in the latter's offices, the title examiner will not be
forewarned of the possible existence of blanket liens filed in the
federal clerk's office during the period in question, and as before
noted, this latter £ling would serve to protect the government
against the intervening rights of a good faith purchaser.
(b) A particular abstract company may have decided that it
should not reflect blanket notices of liens which are on file, though
illegally so, with the county register's office. The failure of the
company to check the federal clerk's office will again mean that
the title examiner will not have even an indirect means of learning
of the possible existence of a lien which has been validated by a
proper notice.
( c) The person, assume it is the vendor in the transaction
now being negotiated, against whom a valid lien is on file with the
federal clerk's office may live in a neighboring county to that in
which the property is located. If the notice of the lien was placed
on file by the government in the county of his residence, and not
in the county where the property in question is located, the notice
will not, of course, appear in the abstract whatever may be the
practices followed in other cases by the abstract company. But
again, the notice in the federal clerk's office, being the only valid
notice, and presumably extending over the entire judicial district,
is there to protect the government against the otherwise bona fide
purchaser. A like result will be reached in the closely related
instance where the person against whom a lien is on file in the
county of his residence moved thereafter from that county into a
neighboring county of the same judicial district where the particular land was located.
(d) The abstract company in question may follow the practice of checking a select number of names in the chain of title
against the filings in the county register's office, the latter being
one of those which, it will be assumed, normally accepts the offerings of the collector. This indirect means of learning of the valid
lien on file with the federal clerk may be inadequate, however,
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simply because of the unsound character of the formula used by
the abstract company in selecting the names which are to be
checked against the county register's .6.les. One might at first suppose that the title examiner is not actually concerned with this
problem, this supposition resting on the assumption that the abstract company is the one at fault. But it is important in this
connection to note that it does not necessarily follow that the abstract company would be liable under such circumstances, for it
has done nothing more than fail to uncover a matter which was
not entitled to be filed in the county office in the first instance,
and, as previously noted, its own certificate serves also to free it
from any liability with reference to the notice which was on £le in
the federal clerk's office. More will be said later with respect to
what might be considered a sound formula for selecting those
names to be checked.
Where the title examiner's only concern is self protection, he can,
of course, accomplish this with reference to all four of the foregoing
situations by simply indicating, in one way or another-as abstract
companies do in their certificates-that marketability is considered in
his opinion only insofar as the same is affected by matters on file or on
record with specific county offices, except, of course, for the traditional
qualifications such as pertain, for example, to the rights of parties in
possession. But query: Has such a lawyer adequately served his client?
In view of the client's real expectations, namely, a clear title, and of
the fact that in 1951 alone over 4000 federal tax liens,36 many blanket
in form, were filed in Michigan, are we not justified in expecting a
title examiner to do "something more" than just qualify his opinion by
limiting its sweep, except for the traditional qualifications, to matters
reHected in the abstract! 37
Assuming then that the title examiner should do something more
than simply qualify his opinion by limiting it to matters on file or on
record in the county offices, the question· arises, what should be the
nature of that "something more?"
36 This ligure was furnished to the author by Mr. James Deane, Assistant Collector of
Internal Revenue in the Detroit office.
37 Jn saying this, the writer is not unmindful of the pressure on examiners to ignore
"Hy-specks." Nor is he unmindful of the sense of security some attorneys may derivesometimes falsely-from the fact that until now the government has apparently made no
effort to disturb those who have been in possession of the tract in which the particular
parties may be interested.
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It would seem that every title examiner should at least acquaint
himself with the exact practices, both past and present, followed with
reference to blanket federal tax liens by his own register of deeds and
by the abstract companies located in his county. Perhaps then a given
title examiner, on £nding that the combined practices of these two
related agencies will result in actually making known to him all
blanket federal liens which have been offered for £ling in his county,
will conclude that he has gone far enough, and will then proceed to
ignore the problem raised by notices on £le in the federal court clerk's
office. In short, he decides to disregard the chance that a client of his
will be trapped, e.g., by the third of the foregoing illustrative situations, namely, the case where a blanket lien is on file in the federal
clerk's office against a lienor whose name appeared in the chain but
who lived in a county adjacent to that in which the property was located.
A second title examiner might, on the other hand, decide that the
risk is too great, and conclude that the federal court clerk's £les should
be checked.
And £nally, a third title examiner may learn that the practices,
past and present, of his local register of deeds and/or of the local abstract companies, will not even acquaint him with all of the notices
which the collector tried to £le, or did £le, in the office of the local
register of deeds. That title examiner may also feel that the federal
clerk's £Jes should be checked. Such a conclusion would leave the
attorney with three alternatives:
(a) He may, in his qualifying clause, specifically advise the
client of the possibility that there may be notices of federal tax
liens on £le with the appropriate federal clerk which are not reflected in the abstract. This would at least serve to focus attention
on the precise difficulty.
(b) In addition to the foregoing reference, he may go on to
recommend that the client require the vendor to bear the expense
for, or to arrange for, the abstract company to check by correspondence the files in the federal clerk's office. The right of the client
to make such a demand upon the vendor assumes first, of course,
that the executory contract of sale called for the submission of
an abstract showing good and marketable title in the vendor; and
secondly, that an abstract which ignores the blanket federal tax
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liens on :6.le in the federal clerk's office would not satisfy that
requirement. 38
(c) Finally, the title examiner may decide, in lieu of an inquiry by the abstract company, to make his own inquiry of the
federal clerk's office.
Should the title examiner choose the third of the foregoing alternatives, he must then ask of himself a question which should also be
plaguing abstract companies when the latter are checking the :files in
the register of deeds' office as well as when making a special search of
the federal court clerk's :files. Just how extensive should the check be?
Which of those names listed in the chain of title should be checked
against those names on :6.le? 39 The resolution of this question involves
a matter of time; how far back in the chain of title must we go in
selecting names to be checked against the clerk's :files?
With reference to the period for which the check is to be made,
attention has already been called to the fact that blanket liens :filed
prior to 1942 did not in Michigan, under the then existing federal
statute, serve to validate the lien as against third parties regardless of
where £led. It would seem, therefore, that the title examiner or the
abstract company would be safe in using this date as a starting point
in the sense that the check should be made against the :files of all those
names which have been in (as contrasted with entered in) the chain of
title since that date.
4. Life span of the general federal tax lien. The use of 1942 as
a base date in initiating a search for blanket liens can also be supported
by a practical approach to the theoretically possible life-span accorded
general federal tax liens. The life-span of such liens is also, of course,
a matter which attorneys must take into account in deciding whether
or not a lien which is reflected in an abstract survives as of the date
of the title examination.
In this connection, I. R. C., section 3671 provides with reference
to the duration of federal liens that such shall continue "until the liability for such amount is satis:6.ed or becomes unenforceable by reason
of lapse of time." This latter clause is given a more clear-cut meaning
38 Cf. Continental Oil Co. v. Mulich, (10th Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 521; Smyth v.
Boroff, 156 Mo. App. 18, 135 S.W. 973 (1911).
39 The formula which is suggested with reference to this question would be of equal
value to those abstract companies which check the files in the office of a register of deeds.
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by, inter alia, I. R. C., section 276(c). This latter section provides
that creditors' processes are available to the government if initiated "(I)
within six years after the assessment of the tax, or (2) prior to the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing by the
Commissioner and the taxpayer before the expiration of such six year
. d,,
peno.
The first of these, the six-year period, offers, of course, a definite
guide. 40 The same cannot be said, however, of the second.41 Nor
can it be said of a related exception, namely, the situation where a tax
debtor has waived the running of the statute pending the acceptance
or rejection by the government of an offer to compromise.42 Nor is
a definite rule of thumb applicable in that situation where the tax
debtor has finally resorted to a bankruptcy proceeding, for there the
six-year period with respect to balances left unpaid on the termination
of such proceedings begins, not from the receipt by the collector of
the original assessment list, but from the close of the bankruptcy proceeding.43 Also to be taken into account are the extension provisions
designed for soldiers' and sailors' relief with their concomitant suspension of the running of the statutory period.44
It seems fair to say, even from this incomplete list of exceptions,
that the title examiner should not in the first instance suppose, without
further exploration of the facts, that a blanket lien has a life short ofsay, ten or twelve years. This would mean, of course, that if the abstract company will use 1942 as a base date with reference to its search
for blanket liens, that the title examiner would not be safe unless he
qualified his opinion by taking exception to all of the blanket liens
disclosed in such an abstract.
Notices which do include a description of the property covered
by the abstract present a somewhat different question. Presumably the
abstract company will reB.ect all such notices regardless of the date of
40 It should be understood in this connection that the lien and the six year period
actually date, not from the filing, but from the time the assessment list was received by
the collector. I.R.C., §3670. This feature of the act is considered in In re Victor Brewing
Co., (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 831, affd. with respect to other matters, Glass City Bank
of Jeanette v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 66 S.Ct. 108 (1945).
41 The author is not aware of any rule or standing operating procedure to which the
government looks in deciding the outermost limits of such extension agreements.
42Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. United States, (6th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 187.
43 I.R.C., §274.
44 I.R.C., §3808.
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filing. Theoretically, in every such case the title examiner should state
as a requirement that the vendor obtain a certificate from the collector
releasing the lien. For in addition to the previously mentioned exceptions to the six year rule, there is the added notion that a tax claim
once reduced to judgment by the government never expires through
lapse of time. 45 And it is theoretically possible that such a judgment
does exist against the lienor. As a practical matter, however, one might
reasonably think it most unlikely that the government would wait more
than ten or twelve years to take advantage of a lien against property of
which, as evidenced by the description, it had knowledge at the time
the notice was filed, and particularly so in the instance where it has
gone to the trouble of getting a judgment against the taxpayer. Certainly it will be the unique case where the government will wait so
long. Less cautious attorneys might conclude, therefore, that such a
possibility is so remote that a lien which antedates that period will be
classed with the "Hy-specks" and ignored, particularly where it is for
a relatively small amount.

5. The character of the interests to which the lien may attach.
Now let us assume that the abstract does reflect a blanket lien which
has not been outlawed. Before actually taking exception to that lien,
the title examiner must answer one other question: would a general
federal tax lien actually attach to the particular type of interest which
the lienor held in the property covered by the abstract?
Reference has already been made to the fact that the statute states
tha:t the lien applies to "all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to" the person "liable to pay any tax." 46
That the first of these phrases, "all property," means what it seems
to mean, and is, therefore, all inclusive is illustrated by the fact that it
has been held that the lien attaches to after acquired property.47 This
same sweeping meaning is also illustrated by the now common case
of a husband and wife who had filed a joint income tax return in order
to split the husband's income for tax purposes. The word "all" has
led the lower federal courts to conclude, in the event inadequate taxes
are paid,, that the lien attached to the homestead of the husband and
& Securities Co. v. United States, (9th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 894.
I.R.C., §3670.
47 Glass City Bank of Jeanette v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 66 S.Ct. 108 (1945).
45 Investment
46
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wife-property which by local law, at least up to a certqin value,
had been put out of the reach of ordinary creditors.48
It must be remembered, however, in connection with the latter
illustration, that the lien attaches only to that property "belonging to"
any person "liable to pay any tax." This language, constituting the
second of the two key statutory phrases, is, of c_gurse, in the nature of a
limitation. It has been held, for example, that the lien would not attach to the wife's interest in a homestead where her husband is alone
liable for the unpaid tax. 49 One might suppose that an even more
important practical consequence of this limitation from the standpoint of Michigan lawyers would be the holdings by two local federal
courts to the effect that this lien will not attach in any respect to property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties where one
spouse was alone liable for the tax, the theory being, of course, that no
part of the property belongs to the husband; its ownership resides in
the fictional, but single, unity of husband and wife.50 But even with
respect to property held by the entireties, a title examiner must be
cautious, for there is always the possibility that the husband and wife
filed a joint income tax return and are, therefore, jointly and severally
liable for the tax. In such a case, notices of liens are likely to have
been directed against both spouses, with the effect that the government
may proceed against the property held by entireties.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this study
is that the Michigan Legislature is not now in any practical or ultimate
sense accomplishing the aim which led it to limit the use of county filing systems to those notices of federal tax liens which included precise descriptions of those tracts against which liens were asserted.
The fact is that cautious title examiners in this state can ill afford
to ignore those blanket notices which are on file with the clerk of the
appropriate federal district court, since such notices, as previously
48 United States v. Heffron, (9th Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 657, cert. den. 331 U.S.
831, 67 S.Ct. 1510 (1947); Shambaugh v. Scofield, (5th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 345.
49 Jones v. Kemp, (10th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 478; Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex.
571, 218 S.W. (2d) 428 (1949).
i;o United States v. Nathanson, (D.C. Mich. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 193; Shaw v. United
States, (D.C. Mich. 1939) 94 F. Supp. 245. Accord, United States v. Hutcherson, (8th
Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 326.
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stated, do probably serve to validate liens against lands in this state.
Accordingly, the legislature would do well to reconsider the relevant
Michigan statute with the view of eliminating the condition pre-requisite ·to £ling which it inserted in 1925. By so doing, the legislature
would limit the effectiveness of blanket notices to those tracts which
are located within the county in which the notice is £led, for the
amendment would serve to terminate the right of the collector to use
the federal £ling system. This would reduce the burden of cautious
title examiners and of those abstract companies which are requested
now to make special searches of the federal :files. In the end, Michigan would be put back in step with the great majority of other jurisdictions in this country.

